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ABSTRACT
We propose a novel technique to identify known behaviors of in-
telligent agents acting within uncertain environments. We employ
Markov chains to represent the observed behavioral models of
the agents and we formulate the problem as a classification task.
In particular, we propose to use the long-term transition proba-
bility values of moving between states of the Markov chain as
features. Additionally, we transform our models into absorbing
Markov chains, enabling the use of standard techniques to compute
such features. The empirical evaluation considers two scenarios:
the identification of given strategies in classical games, and the
detection of malicious behaviors in malware analysis. Results show
that our approach can provide informative features to successfully
identify known behavioral patterns. In more detail, we show that
focusing on the long-term transition probability enables to dimin-
ish the error introduced by noisy states and transitions that may
be present in an observed behavioral model. We pose particular
attention to the case of noise that may be intentionally introduced
by a target agent to deceive an observer agent.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many practical problems of interest can be represented as sys-
tems where intelligent agents interact within complex uncertain
environments, gathering information and adapting their behaviors
accordingly, e.g., security, robotics, entertainment and so forth. In
such scenarios, an important issue is to identify whether a known
behavior appears within a behavioral model that has been learned
through observations [2, 8]. A key challenge in this context is to deal
with the presence of noise, e.g., while performing a difficult task an
agent might make mistakes trying to follow its policy, consequently
injecting noise into the behavioral model learned by observing the
execution of that task. Moreover, noise injection could be inten-
tional, e.g., a malicious agent might try to mask its real intentions
and to deceive potential observers [11].
In this work we aim at improving the identification of behavioral
models performed by an analyzer agent that can interact with and
observe the effect of the actions taken by a target agent which fol-
lows an unknown policy. The main hypothesis of our approach is
that in the long-term, the intended behavior of the target agent will
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emerge, hence allowing the analyzer to filter out possible mislead-
ing observations. Following relevant literature [1, 10, 13, 19, 21, 28],
we represent the behavior of the target agent by using Markov
chains. However, a novelty of our work is to propose the use of the
long-term transition probability of the Markov chain as features to
identify the target agent’s behavior. With long-term transition prob-
ability, we refer to the probability values of going from each state
to every other, giving the process represented by the Markov chain
enough time to reach a fixpoint, i.e., when the result would not
change anymore from that point onward. We design our methodol-
ogy in order to make it applicable independently of the technique
used to obtain the behavioral models of the target agents (as long
as they can be interpreted as Markov chains). Consequently, we
can not make any assumptions on the various properties that the
Markov chains may hold. A crucial technical difficulty related to
this idea is the computation of the long-term transition probability
values as features for generic Markov chains. In fact, while there
are methods to compute different long-term characteristics, e.g.,
the stationary distribution or the time to absorption [9], their appli-
cation is subject to the presence of specific properties, irreducibility
and absorbency respectively, that generic Markov chains may not
have. For example, in our experiments we have large models that
are generated through the observation of an agent’s policy. For such
models, the absorbency property, which is a fundamental require-
ment to compute long-term transition probability, never holds. To
overcome this problem we propose a transformation of the Markov
chain that enforces the absorbency property and allows to derive
the long-term transition probability for the original Markov chain.
Our approach is designed to be employed as an analysis tool fol-
lowing any behavioral model generation techniques when the pres-
ence of noise or deceitful behaviors should be considered. Hence,
the focus of this paper is not to improve the process of obtaining the
behavioral models (although obviously some techniques can give
better final results for particular domains), but rather the approach
used to analyze them after they have been generated. In more detail,
we pose the identification problem as a classification task, where
we are given a set of known models divided into classes, i.e., a set
of labeled Markov chains, and a set of models representing the
observed unknown behavior of the target agents, i.e., a set of unla-
beled Markov chains. Our aim is to identify such unknown models
assigning them to the known classes. The long-term transition
probability values of moving between states are used as features to
train a standard classifier, which is a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
in our case. We conduct two sets of experiments: the first one aims
at identifying known strategies within classical games, namely the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and a repeated lottery game. The sec-
ond one aims at identifying specific malicious behaviors in models
representing dynamics of malicious software agents, i.e., malware.
The first experiment evaluates whether our approach can be used
in a generic setting that involves the interactions of intelligent
agents, whereas the second experiment focuses on the concrete
cyber-security application of identifying malicious behaviors of
software programs.
In summary, our contributions are the following:
(1) We consider the use of a classification approach to identify
unknown behaviors w.r.t. a set of known classes, where
behaviors are modeled as Markov chains. The long-term
transition probability values of moving between states are
employed as features for the task.
(2) We define a transformation for Markov chains enforcing
the absorbency property. This allows us to use standard
techniques to derive the long-term transition probability
for generic Markov chains without requiring any specific
properties.
(3) We empirically evaluate our approach on behavioral models
of players interacting within classical games and of real ma-
licious software agents respectively. Results show that our
technique provides informative features suitable to success-
fully identify known behaviors in both empirical settings. In
particular, this method allows to diminish the effect of noise
injected into the behavioral models by malicious software
agents, overcoming a limitation of the current state-of-the-
art malware analysis techniques.
2 RELATEDWORK
The main focus of this work is to analyze the behavioral models
extracted by observing the effect of the actions performed by a
target agent within a fully observable environment. Markov chains
are particularly suited for such task and have been widely used
in scenarios that range from reliability analysis of software pro-
grams [24] to HTTP traffic optimization [13, 21, 28]. However, the
methods that such previous approaches propose to compare the
different models either impose constraints on the models to be
analyzed, e.g., [24] requires one Markov chain to be a sub-graph of
the other, or perform transformations that are application specific,
e.g., [13, 28] require cycles to be removed and arbitrary states to
be grouped together, hence neglecting significant information for
what concerns behavior identification. Other works [3, 4] provide
methods to compare Markov chains relying on the mixing time
and by directly computing or estimating the stationary distribution.
However, the behavioral models we deal with are generated by
generic techniques, hence we have no guarantee for the existence
of a meaningful stationary distribution, as it requires specific prop-
erties to hold (see Section 3). An interesting work in the context of
detecting opponents is [7], where authors propose a framework for
stochastic games aimed at learning the policy of multiple unknown
adversaries drawn from different populations. We differ from [7]
as we explicitly take into account adversarial agents that may in-
tentionally perform some random or completely unrelated actions
in order to mask their real policy, injecting noise in the behavioral
model. Consequently, an observer agent can be deceived if it does
not consider such potential deviation during the analysis process.
An important domain where agents try to hide their real inten-
tions is cyber-security. Real malicious software agents often employ
anti-detection techniques that inject noise in their execution trace,
making difficult for defense systems to detect such threats. In our
empirical evaluation we consider also this real application context
as it could benefit from our proposed approach. Markov chains have
been employed before to represent malware models as well [1, 10].
Such methods are based on static analysis to extract the API call se-
quences, i.e., features are extracted without executing the program.
However, static analysis suffers from some known drawbacks such
as the difficulty in analyzing obfuscated or encrypted binaries and
the inability to analyze code downloaded and executed at runtime.
To overcome the mentioned problems, we focus on dynamic analy-
sis, that is best suited for an interactive approach as the one we aim
to. In this context, machine learning methods such as clustering or
classification are commonly used to analyze threats. A key point
in both schemes concerns how to extract informative features re-
sulting in good learning performance. A proposed solution often
recurring in literature is to use n-дrams [18, 26], i.e., sequences of
n API calls. Even though good results can be achieved with such
technique, a significant issue is the exponential space requirements
when n increases. Moreover, since n-grams are an approximation of
atomic behaviors embedded in malware, it is difficult to decide the
proper granularity degree of the information represented through
such feature type, i.e., how to select a proper value for n. Now,
classical dynamic analysis is passive, meaning that no interaction
happens during execution between the analyzer and the target
code [6, 14, 27]. As a consequence, malicious behaviors might be
overlooked since it is often the case that a specific action is required
to trigger them [15]. In recent years, there has been an increasing
interest in active dynamic analysis. In [25] authors propose a game-
theoretical framework called Active Malware Analysis (AMA), later
applied to API call graphs in [20]. The analysis is formalized as a
stochastic game where the analyzer tries to find the best action to
perform on the system in order to trigger malicious reactions by
the malware. In [19], AMA is improved by generating the malware
model at runtime, and representing it with multiple Markov chains.
The aim is to group the models with clustering techniques trying
to obtain the same partitioning of the ground truth in terms of mal-
ware families. The features extracted by AMA are the probability
values of transitioning between states of the Markov chains. Such
representation however, prevents to clearly identify small malicious
behaviors appearing within a bigger behavioral model or purposely
injected noise to deceive the analyzer. Indeed, AMA is designed to
be fast and so limited in time, hence it may not capture the behavior
that might arise only in the long-term, as we aim to do instead.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Markov chain tools
Markov chains are formal models to represent fully observable
states of a system with a random variable that changes over time
according to some probability distribution. The following defini-
tions and theorems, along with their proofs, can be found in [9].
Definition 3.1 (Markov chain). Let P be a k × k matrix with el-
ements {Pi j : i, j = 1, ...,k}. A random process (X0,X1, ...) with
finite space S = {s1, ..., sk } is a Markov chain with transition matrix
P if for all n, all i, j ∈ {1, ...,k} and all i0, ..., in−1 ∈ {1, ...,k} we
have
P(Xn+1 = j |X0 = i0, ...,Xn−1 = in−1,Xn = i) =
P(Xn+1 = j |Xn = i) = Pi j (1)
Equation 3.1 expresses the Markov property, i.e., the conditional
probability distribution of the next state depends only on the current
one. Such assumption, even though not realistic in some cases, is
an acceptable approximation in many application domains as in
ours. From now onward we will identify a Markov chain with its
transition matrix and we will also make use of the corresponding
graph representation.
Definition 3.2 (Irreducible Markov Chain). A set of states is ir-
reducible if it is possible to go from each state to any other in an
arbitrary (finite) number of steps. A Markov chain is irreducible if
it consists of a single irreducible set.
Theorem 3.3 (StationaryDistribution). Given aMarkov chain
P , the vector π such that πP = π is the stationary distribution of P .
For any finite, irreducible Markov chain, π is unique.
The stationary distribution π represents the fraction of times a
Markov chain will spend in each state when the number of steps n
becomes large, i.e., as n →∞
Definition 3.4 (Absorbing Markov Chain). Given a Markov chain
P , a state si is absorbing if Pii = 1, otherwise it is transient. A
Markov chain is absorbing if at least one of its states is absorbing
and if from every transient state an absorbing one will be eventually
reached.
If we deal with an absorbingMarkov chain, it is usually preferable
to reorder the states in a canonical transition matrix in order to
clearly identify whether they are transient or absorbing. In our case,
the block decomposition given by the canonical form will be useful
to isolate long-term characteristics of a model we are interested in
studying.
Definition 3.5 (Canonical form of an absorbing Markov chain). If
an absorbing Markov chain P has n transient states and r absorbing
states, its transition matrix can be rewritten as
P =
[
Q R
∅ I
]
where Q is an n × n matrix of the transition probability between
the transient states, R is a n × r non-null matrix of the transition
probability from the transient to the absorbing states, ∅ is a r × n
null matrix, and I is a r × r identity matrix.
Lemma 3.6. For any absorbing Markov chain in canonical form
we have that Qk → 0 as k →∞.
Lemma 3.6 is useful to derive Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 and will be
extensively used in our methodology (Section 4).
Theorem 3.7 (Fundamental Matrix of an absorbing Markov
Chain). The fundamental matrix N of an absorbing Markov chain
P in canonical form is defined as
N = I +Q1 + ... +Qk =
∞∑
k=0
Qk = (I −Q)−1
where each entry Ni j represents the mean of the total number of
times that the chain is in a given transient state sj if starting from
the transient state si . The inverse of (I −Q) is guaranteed to exist for
every absorbing Markov chain.
Theorem 3.8 (Transient states probability).
H = (N − I )N−1dд
Each entry Hi j represents the probability of reaching transient state
sj starting from transient state si before the process is completely
absorbed. Ndд is the diagonal of N .
Note that the transient states probability (Theorem 3.8) is differ-
ent from the stationary distribution (Theorem 3.3). In this paper we
make use of the former in order to extract the long-term probability
values of going from each state to every other.
3.2 Active Malware Analysis
In our work we employ the AMA technique described in [19] to
extract the behavioral models of target agents that we then analyze
with our proposed methodology. The goal of the analyzer agent is
to learn as much information as possible on the target agent and
to generate the corresponding behavioral model, representing it
with Markov chains. The analyzer chooses its action to play at each
stage, from the set of all possible actions, with a Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) using an information-centric reward function based
on entropy. Intuitively, from the behavioral model generated so
far, the analyzer performs an action that is expected to lower the
entropy of such model the most, gaining information on the target
agent. The entropy is computed by using the probability values of
the Markov chain. A behavioral model is represented with a set of
Markov chains extracted from the observation of the target agent’s
actions. Each Markov chain represents the behavior of the target
agent w.r.t. a specific action executed by the analyzer agent. The
described technique takes its name from the application to malware
analysis, but the interesting concepts employed to select the best
actions to generate informative models based on what is observed
can be easily generalized to other domains.
4 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The problem we face in this work is the following: we are given a
set of known behavioral models K partitioned into a set of classes
C , and a set of unknown (unlabeled) behavioral models B of target
agents. All models are represented with Markov chains and have
been generated by observing the changes in the environment as
a consequence of the interaction between an analyzer agent and
a target agent. Our goal is then to assign the unknown elements
of B to the known classes of C . The solution we propose is to
employ supervised learning techniques to train a classifier for B
givenK . The proposed approach is explicitly designed for situations
where an agent reacts to stimuli provided by some other agent. This
is typical of adversarial environments and fits well with several
practical scenarios e.g., generic adversarial games, malware analysis,
but we also apply our methodology to non-adversarial settings such
as single player lottery game (see Section 5). Now, the probability
values of transitioning between every state that are specified by the
transition matrix of the Markov chains could be used as features to
train the classifier. However, such features may be unreliable as they
Figure 1: Markov chain with states in bold (S3, S4, S5) form-
ing a terminal SCC
only represent short-term transition probability, hence neglecting
important information about the long-term behavior of the agent.
Our approach instead, aims at extracting such long-term behavior
from every model by using the long-term transition probability.
This is performed by giving the process represented by the Markov
chain enough time to reach a fixpoint, i.e., when the long-term
transition probability would not change anymore from that point
onward. The long-term transition probability is important as it
represents the probability values of going from every state to any
another without considering the states that are crossed in between.
This is crucial to discard noise that may be present in the behavior
of the agent. For example, in a learning by demonstration setting
for a complex task, a teacher agent might make mistakes while
trying to follow its default policy, injecting noise in its execution
trace. A deliberately harmful scenario instead is when a malware
designer intentionally inserts fake API calls to deceive malware
detection tools. The approach presented in this work allows also to
exploit all the possible paths in the model, considering the presence
of cycles efficiently.
We propose to exploit some well known properties to compute
the long-term behavior of the agents by using the transient states
probability (Theorem 3.8). However, this approach can be used
only for absorbing Markov chains, but since our behavioral models
come from generic extraction techniques, there are no guarantees
that the corresponding Markov chains are absorbing (in our case
studies we are never given Markov chains already absorbing). The
proposed methodology is independent from how the Markov chain
was generated as no assumption is required about the meaning of
the states, or the structure of the Markov chain. In fact, we use
representations with different meanings for the three experimental
settings (see Section 5). To overcome this problem, we define a
procedure to transform any Markov chain into an absorbing one.
The goal is to design a transformation procedure that given as
input any Markov chain provides in output an absorbing Markov
chain, allowing to derive the long-term transition probability for
the original Markov chain we are interested in.
4.1 Absorbing Transformation
Algorithm 1 (AbsEnforcer) details our transformation procedure.
Given a Markov chain M of n states, a corresponding absorbing
Markov chain M ′ with д ≤ n transient states and an absorbing
state sa is created. Only the block matrix Q of the canonical form
(Definition 3.5) is returned since it is the only part used in the
Figure 2: Absorbing transformation applied to the Markov
chain of Figure 1. State S3 has been selected as sm for the
terminal SCC (S3, S4, S5)
subsequent computations. R (д × 1), I (1 × 1) and ∅ (1 × д) can
be easily derived knowing that exactly one absorbing state exists
in M ′ and that every row of M ′ must sum to 1 (if a state had an
outgoing probability value of 0 it would not reach an absorbing state,
henceM ′ would not be absorbing). The first step is to compute the
Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) of the Markov chain [22].
A SCC is a set of states and we distinguish between terminal and
non-terminal SCC. In Figure 1, states (S1, S2) form a non-terminal
SCC, whereas states (S3, S4, S5) form a terminal SCC.
Definition 4.1. We say a SCC A is terminal if there does not exist
a path from a state si ∈ A to a state sj < A, otherwise A is defined
as non-terminal.
Algorithm 1 AbsEnforcer
Require:
M -transition matrix of a Markov chain
Ensure:
Q - block matrix of new absorbing Markov chainM ′
1: sccs ← Tarjan(M) ▷ Find SCCs
2: for all T ∈ sccs , with T terminal do
3: sm ← s ∈R T ▷ Randomly select a merge state
4: for all si ∈ M , with si < T do
5: p ← 0
6: for all sj ∈ T do ▷ Remove edges and record weights
7: p ← p +Mi j
8: Mi j ← 0
9: Mim ← p ▷ Redirect edges to sm ∈ T
10: Merge T into the single state sm
11: Mmm ← 0 ▷ Connect sm to sa with P = 1
12: Q ← M
13: return Q
Given aMarkov chainM , for each terminal SCCT ,AbsEnforcer
merges all the states si ∈ T into a single state sm ∈ T , connecting it
to an absorbing state sa with a new edge. Since we work with the
canonical form (Definition 3.5), and we imposeMmm = 0 (line 11),
the state sm is consequently connected to sa with probability value
1, i.e., in the R block matrix not explicitly represented. The update
of M (lines 4-9) redirects edges entering any state si ∈ T to the
designated merged state sm ∈ T before making it the only state of
T (line 10). Figure 2 shows an application example of AbsEnforcer
to the Markov chain in Figure 1.
In the following we prove that the output of AbsEnforcer is an
absorbing Markov chainM ′ w.r.t. a generic Markov chainM . This
is fundamental as it allows to apply Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 and then
to derive the long-term transition probability forM .
Theorem 4.2. The application of AbsEnforcer to a Markov chain
M always results in an absorbing Markov chainM ′
Proof. Every Markov chain M contains at least one terminal
SCC. Notice that a single state is a SCC since there is always a
0-length path from it to itself. AbsEnforcer creates a new Markov
chainM ′ by merging each terminal SCC T ∈ M into a chosen state
sm ∈ T , and redirecting all incoming edges of the removed states
toward sm . The definition of probability is maintained accumulating
the weights of all the edges redirected for each source state and
assigning the same sum of weights to the new edge toward sm
(lines 4-9). Additionally, sm is also connected to the absorbing state
sa with P = 1 as a consequence of removing any outgoing edge
from it (line 11). Every state si ∈ M ′ is either contained in a terminal
SCC T for M , or in a non-terminal SCC U for M . In the first case
si is a merged state sm ∈ M ′ for T . Consequently there exists a
direct edge in M ′ such that si = sm → sa . In the second case
there exists a path inM ′ such that si ⇝ sm , where sm is the result
of merging a terminal SCC of M . This is true because since the
number of states is limited, following an outgoing path fromU , a
terminal SCC will eventually be reached. Then si ⇝ sm → sa in
M ′. Therefore, every state ofM ′ is either the absorbing state sa or
a transient state that will eventually reach the absorbing state sa .
Hence, from Definition 3.4,M ′ is an absorbing Markov chain. □
The transformation described above, even though removing
states forming terminal SCCs, allows to derive the long-term tran-
sition probability for the original Markov chain, including all the
removed states. To show this we make use of Lemma 4.3. Also no-
tice that every state ofM is a transient state inM ′ (possibly merged
in a sm ).
Lemma 4.3. Within a terminal SCC T , the long-term transition
probability values of going from any state si ∈ T to any state sj ∈ T
converge to 1 as the number of steps n →∞.
Proof. By Definition 3.2, a terminal SCC T is an irreducible
Markov chain, meaning that it is possible to go from each state to
every other with non-zero probability. Moreover, being terminal,
there exists no outgoing path from T . Consequently, starting from
any state si ∈ T , the probability value of reaching any other state
sj ∈ T increases, approaching 1, as the number of steps n increases.
□
As from Theorem 4.2, AbsEnforcer produces an absorbing
Markov chain (specifically, its Q block matrix). Therefore, The-
orems 3.7 and 3.8 can be applied to its output in order to compute
the long-term transition probability as of Definition 4.4.
Definition 4.4 (Long-term transition probability). Given a Markov
chain M , the long-term transition probability value Li j of going
from state si ∈ M to state sj ∈ M can be computed from the
transient states probability H (Theorems 3.7 and 3.8) with
Q = AbsEnforcer(M) as follows
Li j (H ) =

1 if si and sj are in the same terminal SCC inM
0 if si is in a terminal SCC T inM and sj < T
Him if si is not in a terminal SCC inM and sj was
merged into a state sm inM ′
Hi j otherwise
The first case is a direct application of Lemma 4.3, whereas the
third one is a consequence: in the long-term, the probability value
of reaching a state of a terminal SCC T is the same of reaching
any other state of T , as in the long-term they can reach each other
with probability value 1. The second case is trivial: states within
a terminal SCC can only reach other states of the same SCC. The
fourth case is where no adjustment has to be made and the standard
transient states probability can be used.
4.2 Feature Extraction
The feature extraction process is tailored on our supervised learning
approach. As we aim at recognizing known behaviors, we require
a “blueprint” D as input, along with the actual model x from which
to extract the feature vector. The blueprint is used to retrain from
x , only the long-term transition probability values between the
states we are interested in. Hence, the only information that D
needs to contain are states and corresponding edges between states.
The probability values on the edges (for D) are not required since
they are not used in the feature extraction process. Essentially, the
blueprintD is a “shape” onwhich to project the long-term transition
probability extracted from a model x to analyze.
Algorithm 2 Extractor
Require:
D - G(V ,E) blueprint model with k = |V |
M - Markov chain of model x
Ensure:
F - feature vector
1: Q ← AbsEnforcer(M) ▷ Algorithm 1
2: N ← (I −Q)−1 ▷ Theorem 3.7
3: H ← (N − I )N−1dд ▷ Theorem 3.8
4: D ′ ← k × k empty matrix
5: for all edges (si , sj ) ∈ E do
6: if states si , sj exist also inM as sv , su then
7: D ′i j ← Lvu (H ) ▷ Definition 4.4
8: return Flatten(D ′)
Algorithm 2 (Extractor) details the feature extraction proce-
dure for an unknown model x , given a blueprint D. The first step is
to apply AbsEnforcer to transform M into an absorbing Markov
chainM ′, obtaining its block matrix Q (line 1). Now we can apply
Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 to Q as second step, retrieving the transient
states probability values H of going from each state to every other
forM ′ (lines 2-3). The last step is to extract the long-term transition
probability (Definition 4.4) from H , for the states of x that also ap-
pear in the blueprint D (lines 5-7). In our experiments we label the
states of the models we generate in a consistent manner, therefore,
to check if a state of D exists also in x we perform a simple label
comparison (line 6).
We can now solve our classification problem by training a clas-
sifier using the features extracted by Extractor. We first create
blueprints for every class in C . These can be manually crafted by
a domain expert or, as we did in the experiments, can simply be
created from the known models K by choosing representatives
for the classes and retraining their graphs (states and edges, no
probability values). It is also possible to select more than one rep-
resentative per class and to perform a merge to obtain a single
blueprint for such class. Then all the blueprints for the classes
in C are merged together to obtain a single blueprint D. Succes-
sively, we train a classifier extracting the training features from
each d ∈ K by calling Extractor(D,Md ) and using the knowledge
of which class c ∈ C , d belongs to. We then classify the unknown
behavioral models x ∈ B by extracting their features, i.e., by calling
Extractor(D,Mx ), and then querying the trained classifier. Md
andMx are the transition matrices of d and x respectively.
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We divide the empirical analysis in two types of experiments: in the
first one we focus on agents interacting within classical games, i.e.,
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [17] and a repeated lottery game,
while in the second one we analyze real Android malware trying
to identify malicious behaviors. The first experimental setting is
interesting as it shows that our approach can be used in a generic
domain where multiple agents interact and/or observe the effect on
the environment of each other actions. The second experimental
setting instead is crucial in real world IT defense systems. Fig-
ure 3 shows an overview of the empirical evaluation we conducted,
where an analyzer agent performs the Monte Carlo Analysis (MCA)
described in [19] to generate the behavioral models of different
agents, e.g., players of classical games, malicious software agents.
As explained in Section 4, the specific technique employed to gen-
erate the behavioral models is independent from our methodology
used to analyze them. We chose [19] as it is particularly suited to
obtain informative behavioral models within interactive settings.
From such models we apply our approach to extract the long-term
transition probability values as informative features, and compare
the learning quality w.r.t. other different features proposed in lit-
erature, i.e., 1-step transition probabilities (the classical transition
matrix) [19] and n-grams [5, 17].
We design our analyzer agent (a player in the case of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma) to employ the MCA technique of [19] for the inter-
action, i.e., to select the actions to perform in order to gain as much
information as possible on the adversary, trying to minimize the
entropy of the behavioral model being generated. Following [19],
a behavioral model is represented with a set of Markov chains ex-
tracted from the observation of an agent’s actions (see Section 3.2).
For all the experiments we trained a Linear SVM performing a k-
fold cross validation with k = 5. Classification quality is evaluated
using precision, recall, and F1-score. Since each behavioral model
encodes multiple Markov chains, Extractor is applied to each
of them individually in order to extract a feature vector for each
Markov chain, and then performing a concatenation. Figure 4 for
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Figure 3: Overview of our methodology for behavioral anal-
ysis. The dashed area contains the method of [19], whereas
bold text represent our contribution
example, encodes two different Markov chains, i.e., one for action
C and one for action D.
5.1 Classical Games
In the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, two players are given the choice
to cooperate (C) or to defect (D) in a repeated interaction of the same
stage game. While there are various approaches to find strategies
that optimize agents’ payoffs studying equilibria [16], here we focus
on the identification of known strategies only by observing the in-
teraction between players. Hence, we design 6 strategies previously
used in literature [5, 17] for player B (target agent), while player A
(analyzer agent) chooses its actions following the MCA technique
of [19]. The six strategies are: i) tit-for-tat, ii) retaliation, iii) ran-
dom, iv) always cooperate, v) always defect, vi) mixed. Strategy i)
always plays the action played by the adversary in the last game,
whereas strategy ii) cooperates until the adversary defects for the
first time and then defects forever. For strategy vi), cooperate and
defect are chosen with 4/5 and 1/5 probability values respectively.
States are labeled with the joint actions that made the game reach
such state, whereas edges are labeled with the action of player A
that triggered such transition. Figure 4 shows an example of an
observed random behavioral model for player B. States are repre-
sented with the joint actions of the players: CD for example is the
result of actions (cooperate, defect) by player A and B respectively.
Every strategy has been played 20 times in an iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma of length 100, obtaining 120 behavioral models for player
B. The aim then is, given such models, to classify them over the
6 known strategies (classes). The blueprint D has been created se-
lecting random representatives from each strategy and merging all
their graphs together. Table 1 reports the evaluation of the process.
Results show that strategies i), ii), iv) and v) are perfectly identified
by our method. However, since strategies iii) and vi) differ only in
the probability values they assign to actions cooperate and defect,
if the Markov chain states are highly connected, e.g., if they form a
single SCC, the long-term behavior tends to flatten the differences
between transition probability values, making harder to distinguish
behaviors in the long-term compared to the short. This is a limita-
tion of our approach that arises in the pathological case of models
composed only by few terminal SCCs. However, this is unlikely to
happen with more complex models and real world scenarios such
as in our next experiments.
Figure 4: Example of an observed random behavioral model
for player B in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Table 1: Player’s strategy identification for the iterated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma
Strategy Precision Recall F1-score
i) Tit-for-tat 1.00 1.00 1.00
ii) Retaliation 1.00 1.00 1.00
iii) Random 1.00 0.65 0.79
iv) v) Always C/D 1.00 1.00 1.00
vi) Mixed 0.74 1.00 0.85
Total 0.96 0.94 0.94
As second evaluation setting, we define a custom non-adversarial
repeated lottery game [12] as follows: at every iteration, a player
chooses between a safe (S) and a risky (R) lottery, accumulating the
reward at each stage. S gives reward 4 with P = 0.9 and halves the
current accumulated reward with P = 0.1. R gives a reward of 8
with P = 0.5, halves the current accumulated reward with P = 0.4,
and sets it to 0 with P = 0.1. Figure 5 shows an example of an ob-
served behavioral model for the repeated lottery game. The internal
state of the player is assumed to be observable and containing the
value of the current accumulated reward. Such value is used to label
the states of the model, whether edges instead are labeled with the
lottery chosen by the player. In this case, behavioral models are
generated by the analyzer only by observing the player agent, i.e.,
no interaction is involved between the two. We design some similar
strategies w.r.t. the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e., i) always S ,
ii) always R, iii) R until loss (always R until the first loss happens,
S from that stage onward), iv) S until loss (always S until the first
loss happens, R from that stage onward), v) random, vi) mixed (S
with P = 4/5, R with P = 1/5). Additionally, we also design more
complex behaviors where R is played when the current accumu-
lated reward is within a specific range [a,b], S otherwise: vii) R
between [10, 20], viii) R between [10, 50], ix) R between [20, 40].
Every strategy has been played 20 times in a repeated lottery game
of length 500, obtaining 180 behavioral models for the player agent.
The aim, again, is to classify such models over the 9 known strate-
gies (classes). This experiment is different from the previous one
as the generated behavioral models are much bigger (up to 1913
states) and contain a various number of terminal and non-terminal
SCCs, resulting in a comprehensive evaluation setting for our ap-
proach. Also in this case, the blueprint D has been created selecting
random representatives from each strategy and merging all their
Figure 5: Example of an observed behavioral model in the
repeated lottery
Table 2: Player’s strategy identification for the repeated lot-
tery game
Strategy Precision Recall F1-score
i) Always S 0.86 0.90 0.88
ii) Always R 0.95 1.00 0.98
iii) R until Loss 0.89 0.85 0.87
iv) S until Loss 1.00 0.95 0.97
v) Random 1.00 0.95 0.97
vi) Mixed 0.95 1.00 0.97
vii) viii) ix) R between [a, b] 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total 0.96 0.96 0.96
graphs together. Table 2 reports the results of the process, where
it is visible that the strategies are overall well classified. We no-
tice that strategies v) and vi) are identified more clearly w.r.t. to
Table 1. As we mentioned before, in bigger and realistic models,
the flattening problem of the long-term probabilities is much less
prominent. Strategies i) and iii), and strategies ii) and iv) instead,
can be confused with each other depending on when the first loss
happens during the game. Strategy iv) for example becomes exactly
strategy ii) after the first loss. If this change happens at the very
beginning of a game, the two strategies become indistinguishable.
5.2 Malware Analysis
In the malware analysis application scenario, the first step to an-
alyze an unknown software is to decide whether it could be ma-
licious [1, 10]. In this case, the type of countermeasures that an
analyzer should take depends on the type of malicious applications.
Detecting whether a malicious behavior shares common character-
istics with known malware families is extremely important to take
effective countermeasures. Notice that in a malware behavioral
model, a state is not malicious by itself. It is the composition of
multiple states (how they are connected together) that can make a
behaviormalicious overall. A key interesting aspect is that advanced
malware inject noise, e.g., sequences of random or non-dangerous
actions, in their behavior as an anti-detection mechanism, hence
creating an extremely challenging scenario for the analyzers. An-
other complication for the analyzer comes from small malware
injected into bigger, benign applications, e.g., a password stealer
inserted into the code of a game. In this case, the major portion of
the behavioral model corresponds to actions belonging to the be-
nign gaming application, whereas the few related to the password
stealing process appear within them.
Figure 6: Malware model example
From the dataset collected in [23], we selected approximately
1200 malware samples, consisting of 23 families, that better suit an
interactive analysis such as AMA, i.e., reacting to user’s actions. An-
droRAT and GoldDream families are an example of small malware
injected into bigger applications (games and others). They steal per-
sonal information such as contact numbers, sms and call contents.
Gorpo and Kemoge families instead employ anti-detection tech-
niques such as dynamically loading the malicious code at runtime
and performing unrelated actions to intentionally inject noise. The
other families reported are of classical malware, i.e., not injected
and without advanced anti-detection techniques. Models obtained
by analyzing this dataset represent a concrete application context
on real data that is crucial for cyber-security. We compare our ap-
proach with the MCA presented in [19] where the same process is
used to generate the malware models (the difference lies in the fea-
ture extraction as summarized in Figure 3). In this experiment the
internal state of the malware agent is not observable, consequently
states are represented with the effect of the agent’s actions on the
environment (API calls). Figure 6 shows an example of malware
model generated by MCA, where states are labeled with API calls
and edges connect two consecutive API calls observed in a mal-
ware execution trace. As for the previous representations, edges
are labeled with transition probabilities conditioned by analyzer
actions. We also compare with the n-gram features extensively used
in literature [18, 26]. As suggested in such works we experimented
with SVM and K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) classifiers using gram
lengths in the range [1, 4]. To perform a fair comparison, we extract
the n-grams directly from the same execution traces used by the
other twomethods, i.e., MCA and ours. Regarding our approach, the
blueprint D has been generated merging the graphs of the represen-
tatives for each family. Specifically, if the standalone (not injected)
or clean (without anti-detection mechanisms) version of a malware
for a family is known, its behavioral model is used as representative
of such family, otherwise random behavioral models are chosen
from the same family.
Table 3 reports our empirical best results obtained using SVMs
and gram lengths of 1 and 4. In the interest of space we report only
a subset of families, but the considerations made hold for the entire
dataset. The two methods using features extracted from the Markov
chains, i.e., MCA and the one proposed in this work, have overall
better results when compared to n-grams. Using Markov chain
transition probability values as features allows to better capture
distinctive characteristics of the malware dynamics, improving the
classifier performance. Moreover, when comparing MCA to our
Table 3: Malware classification comparison F1-score
Family 3-grams 4-grams MCA Ours
AndroRAT 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.94
GoldDream 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.95
Gorpo 0.77 0.66 0.81 0.93
Kemoge 0.58 0.57 0.44 0.92
Cova 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.97
FakeAV 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Kuguo 0.87 0.85 0.93 0.90
SpyBubble 0.94 0.94 0.63 0.95
Winge 0.78 0.72 0.88 0.86
approach we can notice that the performance of the classifier are
always comparable and most of the time are significantly better in
favor of ours. In more detail, our technique performs significantly
better for malware that are injected into benign applications (An-
droRAT and GoldDream) or for malware employing anti-detection
techniques preforming a lot of noisy actions (Gorpo and Kemoge).
This confirms that using the long-term transition probability values
as features allows to effectively removes noise, significantly improv-
ing the classification performances for such families. With classical
malware (lower half of Table 3) instead, our approach does not con-
sistently provide significant gains and is comparable to the others.
This suggests that our proposed methodology should complement
existing techniques to provide benefits in specific and important
situations, e.g., malware injection and countering anti-detection
mechanisms.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We propose the use of Markov chains to identify known behav-
iors of intelligent agents acting within uncertain environments.
More in detail, we employ classification to solve the problem and
we use the long-term transition probability values as features. We
design a transformation to enforce the absorbency property for
Markov chains, enabling the computation of such features for
generic Markov chains. We evaluate our methodology in three
domains: two player games, a single player repeated lottery game,
and malware analysis. The empirical evaluation shows that our
approach provides informative features to successfully identify
known behaviors. In particular, for the malware analysis scenario
this method allows to significantly outperform state-of-the-art tech-
niques when considering real-world injected malware samples and
advanced anti-detection mechanisms. This work opens several fu-
ture directions, including the application to different domains of
cyber-security, e.g., web-based attacks, and beyond, e.g., malicious
or anomalous behaviors of cyber-physical systems and drones.
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